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Abstract: The probability that buyers are deceived with regard to the quality or safety of pur-
chased products (moral hazard) increases with the profits which suppliers can earn through 
opportunistic behavior. It decreases with the probability and level of losses that result from 
disclosure of malpractice. It also decreases with protective factors rooted in the suppliers’ 
social contexts – such as values, emotional bonds, etc. – which shield them from yielding to 
economic temptations. This paper describes how a systematic analysis of economic incentives 
and social context factors can be provided through an interdisciplinary approach which com-
bines the analytical powers of microeconomics (game theory) and criminology (control theo-
ries). The approach is discussed with regard to food quality and safety threatened by moral 
hazard. Its essentials are illustrated through a case study of grain farmers who might be 
tempted to infringe upon production-related regulations. 
Keywords:  asymmetric information, behavioral food risks, control theories, game theory, 
moral hazard, opportunistic malpractice 
JEL Classification: A13, K32, K42 
1  Introduction: the problem of behavioral food risks 
Food risks are often caused by moral hazard, i.e. by opportunistic malpractice of suppliers 
who exploit the fact that their production activities as well as resulting product properties 
cannot be directly observed by buyers (asymmetric information). Taking the buyers’ point of 
view, asymmetric market information is often described by the term credence quality.  
The probability that quality or health risks (here jointly referred to as “food risks”) are caused 
by malpractice increases with the profits that can be earned through opportunistic behavior 
(white-collar crime). While the probability of white-collar food crime (and thus the immi-
nence of behavioral food risks) can be conceptualized as varying with its expected economic 
benefits, there are different reactions to identical economic temptations. This is due to the fact 
that, in different social contexts, there are different levels of protective factors – such as val-
ues, emotional bonds, peer groups, scenes etc. – that shield actors from deviant behavior.  
Despite a growing societal awareness of behavioral food risk, a systematic research program 
has not yet been developed for its analysis. Thus, substantial knowledge gaps persist both   2
 
regarding the early identification of behavioral risks and the design of adequate preventive 
measures. Effective prevention requires an interdisciplinary systems approach which takes 
the complexity of human decision-making into consideration and which has the capacity to 
provide situational intelligence concerning the economic incentives and the social context 
factors. Up to now, efficient systems analyses of behavioral food risks are impeded by the 
predominance of unilateral disciplinary approaches. Consequently, a full understanding of 
what it is that makes food business operators break (or not break) rules is still lacking.  
The approach outlined in this paper aims to mitigate this problem by combining the analytical 
powers of microeconomics (game theory, moral hazard approach) and criminology (control 
theories, protective factor approach). While differing widely in their toolboxes, the two disci-
plines are related streams of research in that they both resort to methodological individualism. 
This common conception facilitates cooperation across the disciplines without jeopardizing 
the benefits of specialization. It enables analysts from both disciplines to avoid the pitfalls of 
unilateral approaches, i.e. the undervaluation of the impact of social context factors that are 
intrinsically hard to quantify (on the part of economic analysts), and the undervaluation of the 
power of economic incentives that can be quantified (on the part of criminological analysts). 
2  The interdisciplinary approach to behavioral food risks  
2.1  The economic state of the art: game theory and moral hazard 
Hennessy et al. (2003), taking a comprehensive view on food safety and providing a typology 
of different sources for the systemic failure in the provision of safe food, conclude that misdi-
rected incentives and malpractice are a major source of food risk. That is, in numerous situa-
tions non-compliance with regulations and contractual agreements is more profitable for sell-
ers than compliance. This is the reason why preventive measures aimed at eliminating misdi-
rected incentives are an important field of action for public authorities who act on behalf of 
consumers as well as for downstream food business operators who purchase inputs. Interested 
parties need to assess behavioral food risks (positive analysis) in order to identify those food 
chain activities where deviance is a viable proposition to food business operators. They then 
need to manage behavioral risks (normative analysis), e.g. by designing incentive-compatible 
contracts. Such contracts (if available at reasonable costs) work independent of moral atti-  3
 
tudes because they eliminate the temptations to infringe rules (misdirected incentives) and 
replace the need for character trust by situational trust (cf. Noorderhaven, 1996). 
We address the behavioral source of food risks by analyzing incentives and contracts from an 
operational-level moral hazard perspective. The context is that of a supplier (agent) and a 
buyer (principal) of a raw material or (semi-) processed food product. Processing decisions 
made by suppliers affect the probability distributions of the product properties relevant for 
buyers (be they food business operators or consumers). Buyers, however, cannot contract con-
tingent on actual actions because they cannot observe them (asymmetric information). More-
over, they cannot directly observe the product quality either.  
While moral hazard models, which have also become known as principal agent (PA-) models, 
have the capacity to provide valuable insights into the structure of real-life incentive problems 
(cf. Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1987), empirical estimates of parameters such as prices, costs of 
compliance, frequency of control etc. are needed to facilitate practical conclusions. That is, 
we need to answer the question which methods should be used to obtain realistic estimates for 
the parameters that define the players’ payoffs and which kind of models should be specified. 
In most empirical contexts expert opinion is the only source of information for quantifying 
model parameters. Consequently, general PA-model formulations as found in the scientific 
literature (cf. e.g. Kreps, 1990; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) need to be modified into “leaner” 
models (cf. Hirschauer, 2004) which are able to account for the limited availability of data. 
A significant knowledge gap exists with regard to the impact of inspection intensity and 
traceability. While a few authors consider partial inspection and multiple agents (c.f. e.g. 
Demski and Sappington, 1984; Fox and Hennessy, 1999; Starbird, 2005), two essential char-
acteristics of behavioral risks are still to be incorporated into applicable and relevant models 
in the food context: (i) the fact that quality can usually only be observed through random in-
spections, and (ii) the fact that products cannot always be traced.  
2.2  The criminological state of the art: control theories and protective factors 
Since Sutherland coined the expression of “white-collar criminality” (cf. Sutherland, 1940), 
the question why respected members of the professions violate the law has become an inte-
grated part of the criminological discourse. The search for answers has produced a consider-  4
 
able body of knowledge on elite deviance, crimes of the powerful, repressive crime, crimes of 
the middle class and especially organizational as well as occupational crime (Geis et al., 
1995; Friedrichs, 2003). One major consequence of this work has been what may be termed a 
kind of reversal of the burden of proof. Whereas earlier theorists used to see crime and devi-
ance as a minority phenomenon more or less confined to specific groups, economic situations 
and/or psychic disorders, more recent approaches assume an image of the human actor based 
on the rational choice paradigm as specified by the so-called RREEMM model. That is, the 
human actor is being conceptualized as “resourceful, restricted, expecting, evaluating and 
maximizing man” (cf. Esser, 1999 pp. 237-239). This fits the empirical finding that just about 
every member of any human society is sufficiently inclined towards rule-breaking behavior at 
various occasions; and it justifies a turn-around of the criminological perspective away from 
the question why people break to why people obey the law (Tyler, 1990; Hess and Scheerer, 
2004). The so-called “control theories” conceptualize deviance as a social fact the emergence 
of which is due to the inevitability of gaps within the system of formal and informal social 
control (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). In this context the criminological discourse has be-
come aware of different means of social control and their relative merits, and the decisive 
relevance of situations and, correspondingly, of situational crime prevention. This implies to 
use the largely untapped resources of “smart controls” and “soft means” of corporate regula-
tion (cf. e.g. Clarke, 1992; Braithwaite, 2003). The fact that people “with strong bonds to 
conventional social groups or institutions will be less likely to violate the law because they 
have less freedom to do so” (Tittle, 2000 p. 65), can also be rephrased: (1) people are in prin-
ciple prone to develop a motivation for deviance and to act accordingly whenever it fits their 
subjective expected utility; (2) in spite of a prima facie utility, deviance can be prevented by 
“protective factors” like emotional attachment to law-abiding family, religious affiliations etc. 
To find out why people obey the law in spite of contrary economic temptations, one therefore 
has to investigate the nature and extent of social bonds working as protective factors.  
The specific potential of control theories, i.e. to look for effective bonds to norms still has to 
be activated with regard to white-collar crime. This applies especially with regard to white-
collar delinquency in food business operations. There seems to be no systematic empirical 
research to speak of that addresses this issue from an explicit control theories perspective.   5
 
2.3  Synergies and joint conceptual background  
Micro-economists, while focusing on economic goals and individual choice, have adopted the 
concepts of imperfect information, bounded rationality, opportunism and multi-goal decision-
making. Criminologists who can be seen as social psychologists in the field of delinquency 
understand deviance on the micro-level as behavioral strategies of coping with personal goals 
(Kaplan, 1995) and strain (Agnew, 1999). While adopting the concept of choice, they focus 
on the individual’s behavior depending on his social settings and value systems.  
The overall conceptions of modern economists and criminologists are quite similar in that 
they resort to methodological individualism and assume that purposive action in conjunction 
with the individual’s social context factors are responsible for his behavior. The fact that the 
two approaches focus on different aspects may nonetheless lead to a different perception. This 
may be enhanced by their respective affinity to quantitative vs. qualitative methods. Focusing 
on monetary incentives and treating social factors merely as constraints or subordinate objec-
tives, economists may undervalue the impact of social factors. The reverse, i.e. the risk to 
undervalue the power of monetary incentives may arise in criminological approaches.  
It seems that a lot of knowledge could be gained by combining the analytical power of eco-
nomics with that of criminology: the PA-model facilitates a quantitative analysis of misdi-
rected economic incentives. The criminological facilitates a qualitative reconstruction of pro-
tective social factors which make actors comply despite contrary economic incentives. The 
diverse forms of social control resist their representation in formal models. Thus, we deliber-
ately exclude the social determinants of human behavior from the economic model. It seems 
that more knowledge can be gained by explicitly leaving them to a qualitative criminological 
analysis. Synthesizing the disciplinary results follows the rationale that offences are imminent 
if misdirected economic incentives coincide with missing protective factors.  
3  A case study of grain farmers’ incentives and social contexts  
Conventional European grain farmers regularly apply a last dose of fungicides five to six 
weeks before harvesting. Applied products are labeled for control of fungal infections which 
could reduce the grain quality. Farmers might be tempted to breach the minimum waiting pe-
riod of 35 days if, a few days before expiration, ripeness and weather are ideal for harvesting.    6
Three farmers provided expert opinion for the case study. They sell their wheat to a grain 
dealer who takes and stores samples from all individual trailer loads, tests them for their tech-
nological qualities (humidity, protein etc.) and differentiates prices for different quality cate-
gories. Before testing for pesticide residues, the grain dealer blends the individual “loads” into 
“batches” according to technological specifications. Thus, infringements are only detected if 
the blended batch exceeds the tolerance limits. This happens only if a critical number of farm-
ers simultaneously break the rule. Otherwise, residues are “sufficiently” diluted and free-
riders stay undetected. Free-riding “moves the residue distribution to the right”. It arises pre-
cisely because the group appears trustworthy on the whole, but is (morally) heterogeneous. 
3.1  Economic incentive analysis 
The model 
With a view to the empirical application, we resort to a general discrete PA-model as de-
scribed, for instance, by Kreps (1990 p. 577). The model assumes that a risk-averse agent has 
opportunity costs (reservation utility) µ  for accepting a contract. After accepting, he has the 
choice between discrete actions an ( n = 1,2,…,N) and corresponding deterministic efforts 
kn < kn+1. In a stochastic environment, these actions result – with given probabilities πnm – in 
discrete outputs ym < ym+1 ( m = 1,2,…,M). For these outputs the principal defines output-
dependent remunerations wm < wm+1. The agent’s utility depends on his remuneration and 
effort ( ), where u(wm) represents a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. If 
the principal is risk-neutral, his design problem can be stated as follows: 
n m k w u − ) (
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Since expert opinion is the source of information for quantifying the model parameters in our 
case (and many other related food risk contexts), we adjust the general model to the type and 
availability of data by making the following modifications: (1) We apply a binary perspective 
and consider only two possible actions (a1 = non-compliance; a2 = compliance), two corre-
sponding effort levels (k1 < k2), two outcomes (y1 < y2), and two remunerations (w1 < w2). 
This enables us to use expert estimates in the form of binomial distributions for variables such 
as outcome and remuneration. (2) Instead of accounting for risk aversion endogenously, we 
assume risk neutral principals and agents in model calculations. Therefore, optimal risk shar-
ing will not be our concern here. (3) We assume a reservation utility µ  = 0. This reflects a 
situation with binding regulations where the agent has to refrain from production if he does 
not officially “participate”. (4) We assume that the principal is pre-determined to induce com-
pliance and only strives to do so at minimum (budgetary) costs. Hence, the second step of the 
optimization can be omitted and the problem is reduced to cost minimization. (5) We take into 
account that observation can only take the form of random sampling inspections carried out 
with a control intensity s ≤ 100 %. (6) We consider the fact that identified properties cannot 
always be retraced to a single upstream supplier by incorporating a traceability (tracing prob-
ability) coefficient z ≤ 100 % into the model. 
Instead of simply reformulating the Kreps-model for the above-mentioned modifications we 
now use the handier notation from table 1. Contrary to complete inspection and traceability 
where output probabilities coincide with remuneration probabilities, partial inspection and 
traceability generate modified remuneration probabilities. That is, both a control intensity 
s < 1 and a traceability z < 1 change the expected remuneration for non-compliance w(a1) as 
well as for compliance w(a2): independent of the product quality, the principal has to pay P 
whenever the quality is not ascertained or cannot be ascribed to a single agent. The agent can 
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Table 1: Notation for the binary food risk model 
   s  intensity (frequency) of random product inspection (0 < s ≤ 100 %) 
 
 
     z  probability that responsible suppliers are traced (0 < z ≤ 100 %) 
w1 =  -S   sanction (loss) inflicted on the agent if the undesired/hazardous quality y1 is detected 
w2  =   P   regular price paid for a product of the desired quality y2 
k2-k1=k2 =   K   agent’s cost of compliance with regulations 
π11 =   r   probability of undesired quality y1 conditional on action a1 (i.e. non-compliance) 
     szr  remuneration probability for -S conditional on action a1 (i.e. non-compliance) 
π12  =   1-r  probability of desired quality y2 conditional on action a1 (i.e. non-compliance) 
     1-szr  remuneration probability for P conditional on action a1 (i.e. non-compliance) 
π22 =   q   probability of desired quality y2 conditional on action a2 (i.e. compliance): q > 1-r 
     1-sz(1-q)  remuneration probability for P conditional on action a2 (i.e. compliance) 
π21  =   1-q  probability of undesired quality y1 conditional on action a2 (i.e. compliance) 
     sz(1-q)  remuneration probability for -S conditional on action a2 (i.e. compliance) 
 
We replaced k2-k1 by the costs K of compliance. It is unrealistic to assume that food business 
operators produce the unauthorized quality at cost k1 = 0. For the sake of simplicity we nor-
malize k1 to zero and avoid having an extra variable without impeding the insights of the 
analysis.  
 
Additionally considering the control costs depending on the intensity c(s) and the costs of 
imposing sanction c(S), the principal’s design problem is to be restated as follows:  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 S c s c S P q sz P Min S c s c a w Min ) + + + ⋅ − ⋅ − = + +         (1’) 
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( . . 2 2 ≥ − + ⋅ − ⋅ − = − K S P q sz P k a w t s              ( 2 ’ )  
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 2 2 ≥ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ = − − K S P r q sz a w k a w             (3’) 
1 0 ≤ < sz  
While there are only few parameters to be considered in the model, their empirical estimation 
still represents a formidable task. It is not trivial, for instance, to define different control alter-
natives and to provide their cost estimates (let alone intensity-dependent control cost func-
tions c(s) for different control systems and technologies). In our case study, we therefore 
solely assess the current incentive situation and tentatively investigate incentive-compatible   9
 
alternatives through variant calculations. That is, we determine the parameters K, q, r, s, z, P, 
and S, and then use equation (3’) to quantify resulting incentives. 
Farmers’ economic decision parameters and incentives 
Since only a limited number of discrete data can be gained in expert interviews, the farmers 
were asked to assess the economic parameters for three discrete types of weather, implying, in 
turn, three different “technologically optimal” harvest dates: 6 days and 2 days prematurely as 
well as an optimal harvest date after expiration of the waiting period. The term “technologi-
cally optimal” implies that, in the absence of a prescribed waiting period, farmers would har-
vest because they expect quality losses and increased harvesting costs for any posterior date. 
 
Table 2: Economic decision parameters if it is technologically optimal to harvest 6 days pre-
maturely 
  parameter  Farmer A  Farmer B  Farmer C 
1) probability that the farmer exceeds the residue limit in  
his individual load if he harvests 6 days early 
2) probability that the farmer is detected if his individual  
load has exceeded the residue limit  
3) losses (€/ha) if the farmer complies with the waiting  
period despite contrary technological weather conditions  
4) losses in sales (€/ha) if non-compliance is proven 
5) “sanctions” (€/ha) if non-compliance is proven 
thereof:    - short-term sanctions (fines, damages, …) 
                - capitalized long-term losses in the market 














































Ad 1): farmers agreed that there is no risk of exceeding the residue limit if they comply. 
Trusting that a safety margin had been built into the prescribed 35 days, they also agreed that 
harvesting two days early would still involve a zero probability of exceeding the limit. Ac-
cording to this perception, a 2-days-infringement of the waiting period has the same outcome 
as compliance (r = 1-q = 0 %). For the 6-days-infringement farmer A (B, C) estimated the 
probability of exceeding the limit to rise to r = 5 % (50 %, 20%).   10
 
Ad 2): in the considered case, the probability s results from the joint effect of two factors: 
(i) the control intensity and (ii) the dilution effect caused by the fact that individual loads are 
blended before tests are made for residues. All farmers ignored the actual percentage of 
batches that are controlled. They likewise ignored the determinants of the dilution effect such 
as their own share in a batch, or the behavior of other farmers. They provided ad hoc esti-
mates, however, regarding the overall effect of these factors (i.e. the probability that an in-
fringement is detected if their individual load exceeds the limit): 5% (A and C), and 50% (B). 
Ad 3): the compliance costs K arise from two sources: if it is technologically optimal to har-
vest 6 days early, all three farmers expected a 50%-threat of degradation from food to feed 
quality, resulting in an expected loss of 87.5 €/ha (A and C) and 105 €/ha (B). Furthermore, 
farmers A and C (B) estimated machinery costs to increase by 12.5 €/ha (25 €/ha).  
Ad 4): farmers are convinced that they would completely loose their income from wheat sales 
(including EU-subsidies) of P = 984 €/ha if non-compliance was detected.  
Ad 5): farmers estimated that they would have to pay an equivalent of 350 - 20 000 €/ha in 
direct sanction payments such as fines, damage compensations etc. Farmer B’s and farmer 
C’s perception of comparably high sanctions is mainly due to their understanding that they 
could be forced to pay damage compensations for large quantities of grain if these were con-
taminated by their individual load. Furthermore, farmers assumed that their capitalized future 
losses on the market would amount to 375 - 750 €/ha. 
Ad 6): farmers agreed that the traceability z amounts to 100 % due to the fact that samples are 
taken and stored from their individual loads according to EU-regulations. 
Table 3 demonstrates the incentive situation which results from the farmers’ perception of the 
relevant parameters in force. Only farmer A perceives an economic reason to infringe upon 
the waiting period if it is technologically optimal to harvest 6 days prematurely. His actual 
behavior in the light of such a temptation is not known. 
   11
 
Table 3:  Economic inferiority (−) / superiority (+) of complying with the waiting period if it 
is technologically optimal to harvest 6 days prematurely (€/ha) 
Farmer A  Farmer B  Farmer C 
− 95  + 5 304  + 44 
 
Resorting to (3’) a critical value analysis reveals which changes (sanctions, controls) would 
ceteris paribus ensure/maintain incentive-compatible contracts. It should be noted that, in the 
case under consideration, the participation constraint (2’) does not need to be accounted for in 
such a critical value analysis. It is possible to design “boiling-in-oil-contracts” (cf. Rasmusen, 
1994 p. 180) since the probability of the desired product quality is q = 1 for complying farm-
ers. Thus, they are neither affected by increased sanctions nor by intensified controls.  
 
Table 4: Incentive-compatible contract alternatives  
  Farmer A  Farmer B  Farmer C 
critical sanction with retention of the present  
system of batch controls (s = 5 %) 
39 016 €/ha  no sanction 
needed 
9 016 €/ha 
critical sanction after introduction of complete  
individual controls (s = 100 %) 




critical individual control intensity with present sanc-
tions: A: 1 100 €/ha, B: 20 750 €/ha, C: 13 375 €/ha  
96.0 %  1.2 %  3.5 % 
critical individual control intensity with assumed sanc-
tions: A: 2 200 €/ha, B: 41 500 €/ha, C: 26 750 €/ha 
62.8 %  0.6 %  1.8 % 
 
If mixed batch controls are maintained, the sanction perceived by farmer A needs to increase 
from its present level of 1 100 €/ha to 39 016 €/ha in order to eliminate his 95 €/ha-temptation 
to break the rule. Since it seems unrealistic that the principal succeeds in making the farmer 
believe in such a sanction, we consider replacing the downstream control point “blended 
batch” by the upstream control point “individual load”, thus eliminating the dilution effect. 
With complete individual controls (s = 100 %),  a  sanction  of  1 016  €/ha would suffice to 
eliminate misdirected economic incentives for farmer  A. Alternatively, with the presently 
perceived sanction of 1 100 €/ha, controlling 96 % of individual loads would be sufficient.    12
 
Considering farmer B and C reveals that, due to information uncertainties, the incentives “in 
force” are in the eyes of the beholder. Farmer B, for instance, clearly perceives no temptation 
whatsoever to break the rule. After switching over to individual controls, a control intensity of 
1.2 % (3.5 %) would generate incentive compatibility for farmer B (C). 
The grain dealer’s view of the incentive situation is that a shirking farmer’s risk of being 
detected is almost zero due to the dilution effect, and that situational incentives are indeed not 
“right”. However, he states to rely on character trust with regard to his farmers. This state-
ment triggers the question whether he is really motivated to act as a “responsible principal”. 
Responsible principals would indeed act on behalf of the downstream chain by trying to iden-
tify optimal control points and to design incentive-compatible contracts. The “making of re-
sponsible principals” requires that they are forced to internalize societal costs resulting from 
downstream diseconomies and finally from consumers’ exposure to increased residue levels.
  
Abstracting from individual particularities, we can finally generalize from the last row of ta-
ble 4 that increasing the sanction level allows for a decrease of the control intensity without 
compromising the incentive compatibility. With a given sanction level, increasing the price 
(and thus the threat of sales losses in case of disclosure) would equally allow for a decrease of 
the control intensity. If we knew the control costs depending on the control intensity and the 
costs for imposing different levels of sanctions an optimal combination of price, sanction and 
control intensity could be formally derived (Hirschauer, 2004) by using equation (1’) to (3’). 
It should be noted that a realistic model which tries to reconstruct human behavior needs to 
incorporate the relevant factors as perceived by the decision-makers. The essence of our in-
centive analysis can be pictured through a typology consisting of two extreme- and one 
mixed-type decision-maker. We arrive at these three types by distinguishing between “charac-
ter trust” and “situational trust”: (1) on the one extreme is the farmer whose character is ut-
terly trustworthy. Because of his personal set of preferences he resists every perceived eco-
nomic temptation to break the rules. (2) On the other extreme is the farmer who is only trust-
worthy if, given his exclusive objective of maximizing profits, the perceived situational incen-
tives of the contract are “right”. (3) Between these two extremes is the mixed-type farmer 
who accepts, for instance, a certain profit trade-off in exchange for a personal feeling of moral   13
 
integrity resulting from his decision to abide by the rules. He might yield to rule-breaking 
behavior, however, if the additional profits to be gained exceed his personal resistance.  
3.2  Social context analysis 
It is common sense to assume that real decision-makers are of mixed-type. They are likely to 
differ, however, with regard to their personal resistance to temptations, i.e. the level of protec-
tive factors that are individually effective. This is the reason why a systematic analysis of 
formal and informal mechanisms of social control is needed to understand actual behavior.  
In the present case study, only farmer A’s perception creates a temptation to violate the wait-
ing period. If motivated solely by his expected monetary costs and benefits he would have to 
opt for deviance in order to maximize profits. This makes it necessary to find out about his 
actual choices and their motivation. To find out he was interviewed at two separate occasions. 
The first interview was conducted on the premises of the farm. Its purpose was to establish a 
working relationship and to gather general information about rules, practices and relationships 
in the farmer’s work context. There was ample opportunity to speak with the farmer himself 
as well as (partly separated) with employees and colleagues of his. During a car tour of the 
area and a restaurant visit in the nearby village, a certain insight could be gained into farmer 
A’s life-world and into the opinions of his relevant relations. Four weeks later, remaining 
questions could be cleared by a focused (20-minute) phone interview with farmer A. 
The basic finding was that A – according to his own convincing affirmation as well as suppor-
tive testimonies of “relevant Others” – would rather take a financial loss than break the rules. 
He is also being seen this way: as a highly respectable and at the same time highly successful 
farmer. Asked for the reasons for this “uneconomic” attitude, A responded that he obeyed to 
something like “a sense of honor” which made him “want not to be one of those”. “Those”, it 
was understood, being “those who do not earn their living by honest work, but rather by 
cheating and concealing”. Asked if he knew anybody of this “bad” kind, he denied any per-
sonal knowledge, but non-verbal evidence gathered at the first meeting told us the contrary.  
As far as farmer A himself was concerned, we were convinced that he was sincere in his 
statement regarding his own behavior: there was something inside of farmer A which in effect 
limited his subjective freedom to commit unlawful acts. To find out more about the protective   14
 
factors at work, he was asked about his emotional attachment to relevant Others. In spite of 
his (deceased) parents’ strict adherence to religion and especially his father’s active Catholic 
Church practice, A said that his actions were not governed by religious motives. Asked with 
regard to whom he would feel most ashamed if a hypothetical rule violation transpired, he 
mentioned his wife and (also farming) son and his friends in the village community and col-
leagues who might “point fingers” at him. With his wife being a teacher and belonging to a 
different social milieu, where such farming details would hardly get to, the most relevant Oth-
ers were obviously his farming environment including his own staff. Rather than fear of being 
found out, it was a sense of honor that attached farmer A to his personal community and – 
indirectly – to the rules that this community expected to be respected. 
On the other hand, while speaking with his son, farmer A became conscious of a transgression 
which he indeed had once committed. He had infringed upon the 35-day waiting period by 
two or even (less likely) three days. This transgression had escaped the farmer’s memory (or 
even his conscious experience), and there was no indication that would have suggested a de-
liberate attempt at concealing this transgression. This episode – while prima facie contradict-
ing the assumption of effective protective factors – can be helpful in terms of drawing atten-
tion to the nature and limits of those factors. Since farmers were bound by the common con-
viction that a transgression of two to three days was within the (assumed) safety zone already 
built into the 35-day period, these days were not completely covered by the reign of what they 
understood as “the rules”. As a matter of fact, a criminologist is reminded of the difference 
between the “law-in-the-books” (the so-called “first code”) and the “law-in-action” (“second 
code”). While the informal “second code” of the farming and village community basically 
supports the legal “first code” normative order, it evidently draws the line a little bit different 
from the official order, thus leaving a small strip of normative ground uncovered or only 
fragmentarily protected. It is within this “no man’s land” where the infraction took place, ren-
dering it much less important for A and innocuous in terms of his reputation, thus making this 
behavior eligible for being ranked down in relevancy and sent into oblivion. It could escape 
his consciousness, because it was considered a justified and innocuous exception to the rule of 
conformity, and that is why it had to be brought into it through the conversation with his son.   15
 
This little episode can be contrasted with a hypothetical aggravation of circumstances. If, e.g., 
there had been an obligation to put down the date of spraying and the date of the harvest in an 
official book, and if any entry in this book had had to be signed by the farmer in person, his 
sense of attachment to the community would have prevented a violation: to falsify and sign an 
official entry in a document would certainly have been regarded something anathema by A. 
4  Outlook 
Designing effective measures against behavioral food risks requires systems analysis ap-
proaches which consider all relevant factors that motivate human behavior. While expert 
opinion is often the only available source of information, game-theoretic PA-models are effi-
cient means to process quantifiable information. Other factors such as diverse forms of social 
control and the actor’s intrinsic motivation, however, resist their representation in formal 
models. Nonetheless, they may represent crucial determinants of human behavior. Our mes-
sage is that we have a big chance to improve our understanding of what it is that makes peo-
ple choose certain actions if economic and non-economic social science disciplines systemati-
cally combine the relative merits of their approaches and toolboxes. In a context such as the 
considered case, social factors which are intrinsically hard to quantify should be explicitly 
excluded from the economic model even though they are payoff (utility) relevant in principle. 
The complementary criminological analysis guarantees that – instead of being merely consid-
ered as constraints or subordinate objectives – social factors are not underestimated, but con-
sidered comprehensively by using an adequate toolbox and a different perspective.  
The findings of our demonstration case study have illustrated the suitability of an economic-
criminological approach for the analysis of behavioral risks. Adequate decision and policy 
support, however, requires further research revealing behavioral regularities: first, the case 
study of three selected farms needs to be complemented by a broad investigation of represen-
tative samples of farmers in different regions, with different farm sizes etc. Second, a nearly 
endless number of activities on all levels of different food chains may represent sources of 
behavioral risks and thus relevant objects of investigation. They all lend themselves to the 
above-described economic-criminological research. However, given budgetary constraints 
and the costs of investigations, one will first need to scan the food chains and to gain expert   16
 
knowledge in order to narrow down the number of in-depth investigations to the most immi-
nent threats. Third, the positive analysis should be complemented by a normative analysis aim-
ing to find the optimal mix of risk reducing measures. We know that the optimal mix is char-
acterized by the expectation that gains from further efforts to reduce misdirected incentives 
and/or to enhance protective factors will be smaller than the costs caused by these efforts. One 
might add, however, that this is difficult since there is no universally optimal mix.  
Instead, the optimal mix depends on the specific contingencies of the situation. Besides the 
parameters defining the agents’ incentives, its identification requires informed expectations 
regarding the costs of control depending on the control intensity, the costs of imposing differ-
ent sanctions, and, in the long run, even the costs for changing the overall structures of the 
chain. It also requires estimates concerning the costs of measures to enhance protective fac-
tors. Furthermore, the problem needs to be attacked of how to deal with groups of agents who 
are heterogeneous, both with regard to their costs of compliance and their level of protective 
factors. That is, one needs to consider the adverse selection aspect of the incentive problem.  
Future work should also focus on the development of easy-to-apply tools and on how these can 
be combined most efficiently, e.g. by public authorities, for a systematic analysis and preven-
tion of behavioral food risk on all levels of food chains. Extending efforts to a systematic 
analysis of food chains or the food sector at large may require that the structure of the above-
described PA-model is developed further and extended with regard to its restrictive assump-
tions. It may also require to further develop the criminological approach, for instance by in-
cluding ethnographic perspectives and concepts of comparative deviance and cultural crimi-
nology. However, before increasing the complexity of applied approaches it should always be 
critically checked whether informational gains justify additional costs.   17
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